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STUDENT WRITINGS
The Blaze Construction Case:1 An
Analysis of the Blaze Construction Tax
Cases and the Implications on
Avoidance of Taxation in Indian
Country
ABSTRACT
In 1994 New Mexico found that, in spite of arguments supporting
the Indianlaw-federal preemption doctrine,Blaze Construction,a
federal contractorbuilding roads in Indian Country, ultimately
owed state taxes like any otherfederal contractoroutside of Indian
Country. New Mexico based its holdings on the intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine enunciated in United States v. New
Mexico. In 1997 an identicalcase broughtin Arizona reasonedthat
the applicationof Indian law-federal preemption doctrine barredits
state taxes on the same federal contractor. Arizona applied the
principles of balancing federal, state, and tribal interests as
exemplified in White Mountain v. Bracker and Ramah Navajo v.
New Mexico. However, the Supreme Court has recededfrom the
rationale supporting those case holdings. Ever since Cotton
Petroleum v. New Mexico, the Court has chartereda new path in
deciding state taxation questions in Indian Country. The Court is
beginning to equate the intergovernmentaltax immunity of the
tribes with that of thefederalgovernment. It now looks to the legal
incidence of a tax, instead of the economic burden of the tax, to
inform its decisions. This shift portends the atrophyof the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrinefor influencingfuture taxation
cases. After Blaze, states may be able to impose taxes on non-Indian
contractors in Indian Country that were previously barred by
federal judicial doctrine protecting the tribes from state
interference.

1. This article was written and completed in advance of the Supreme Court decision in
Arizona Department of Revenue v.Blaze Construction, 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999). An analysis of
significant Indian Country tax cases informs the accurate prediction of the holding and
rationale of the Blaze case by the author. An "Addendum" recapitulates the actual holding of
Blaze and predicts its implications on future taxation issues in Indian Country grounded upon
the analysis in the article.
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INTRODUCTION
Taxes! "... in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except
death and taxes."2 Everybody has to pay taxes. To a certain degree, taxation
on business activities and natural resource development negatively impacts
profit potential. Therefore, most business or natural resource developers
want to avoid paying taxes-legally, if possible. Like most businesses,
Blaze Construction Co., Inc. (Blaze) was no exception in that regard.
Usually, business and natural resource developers never find a way to
reduce their tax burden. However, unlike most business and natural
resource developers, Blaze had a different angle to try, a new twist to an
old story.
In 1986 Blaze garnered a lucrative contract with the Bureau of
Indian Affairs to start performing road construction3 on Indian
reservations, first in New Mexico and later in Arizona.4 Bill Aubrey, the
sole shareholder of Blaze, felt that his situation possessed certain "Indian
elements" that would preclude state taxation of his activities. Bill Aubrey
is a Blackfeet Indian. Consequently, Blaze is an Indian-owned enterprise
organized under the laws of Oregon and the Blackfeet Tribe. Blaze
performed work almost exclusively on Indian reservations throughout the
western United States for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).5 Since Blaze
qualified as a 100 percent Indian-owned enterprise, it received special
consideration in the awarding of contracts from the BIA.' Therefore, Blaze

2. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13,1789), reprinted in
Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 218 (3rd ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
3. See Federal Lands Highway Program, 23 U.S.C. § 204 (1994) (establishing a
coordinated program for highways on all federal lands including forest lands, public lands,
Indian lands, and national parks to be administered by the Secretary of Transportation and
the Secretary of the Interior).
4. In New Mexico, the contract called for roads to be built on the Jicarilla Apache and
Navajo Reservations, as well as Laguna and Zia Pueblos. In Arizona, the contract called for
roads to be built on the Navajo, Hopi, Fort Apache, Colorado River, Tohono O'Odham, and
San Carlos Reservations.
5. As a prime contractor, Blaze constructed roads and built housing as its two main
activities. Blaze rendered the bulk of its work for either the BIA or for various tribal entities
throughout the West.
6. See 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1994). Originally enacted in 1908, the "Buy Indian Act" promotes
Indian economic self-sufficiency by providing a preference for Indian-owned businesses to
earn federal government contracts providing products and services in Indian Country. Many
tribes mirror similar preferential consideration in the awarding of tribal contracts for products
and services. The US. Constitution and laws generally prohibit preferential treatment in the
awarding of government contracts. However, preferential treatment for Indian contract
awards and employee hiring by the BIA and Indian tribes is permitted because of the special
relationship existing between the federal government and Indian tribes. This preferential
treatment rests on the "political distinction" of Indians in the United States, "not on any racial
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contended that the aforementioned "Indian elements" connected with its
business exempted it from state taxation because of the "Indian law-federal
preemption doctrine"7 recognized by the courts.
Arizona v. Blaze Construction Co.' seeks resolution of some
confusing issues regarding the taxable transactions of a construction
contractor in Indian Country9 by a state sovereign."0 The case will settle one
more complicated aspect of taxes in Indian Country. No matter what the
decision, its ripples will be felt throughout the states containing Indian
Country. However, the outcome may also raise as many questions as it
settles.
The authority to tax is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty. States
have always had authority to tax, as long as they did not interfere with

distinction." See Morton v. Mancari, 417 US. 535 (1974) (holding that employment preferences
for Indians did not represent invidious racial discrimination, but promoted Indian selfgovernment, and was not impliedly repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunities Act
of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)).
7. Modem court cases do not focus solely upon inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to
state taxation of economic activities within reservations. Since McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax
Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), courts rely primarily upon the concept of federal statutory
preemption to resolve these issues, leaving Indian sovereignty relevant as a backdrop against
which applicable treaties or statutes are read. The McClanahan preemption analysis has
evolved somewhat since 1973. Therefore, during the years that Blaze Construction brought
its issues, courts were utilizing a particularized, yet flexible, inquiry. This inquiry balances the
tribal and federal interests (as informed by relevant law) with the state interests in taxing the
disputed activity to arrive at their decisions. See Cotton Petroleumv. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 165,
176 (1989) for a discussion of this evolution and the nature of Indian law-federal preemption
analysis during this period. See also Robert W. Alexander, The Collision of Tribal Natural
Resource Development and State Taxation: An Economic Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 387,397-401
(1997).
8. Arizona v. Blaze Constr., Co., 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999). This article was written on the eve
of the U.S. Supreme Court arguments and decision.
9. "Indian Country" is the geographic area defined by federal statute as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Even though contained within a criminal statute, courts have applied
this definition in the civil context as well. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 US. 425,
427 n.2 (1975); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,207 n.5 (1987).
10. See Petitioner's Brief in Chief at 2, Arizona v. Blaze Constr., Co., 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999).
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interstate commerce." Indian tribes also possess the authority to tax within
their geographical domain. 2 As for the states, a positive decision by the
Supreme Court will clear up some confusion that exists in the area of a
state's taxation authority within Indian Country. States will gain more
predictability in tax administration and secure additional sources of
income. For the Indian tribes, many of whom are just beginning to exercise
some of their sovereign authority in this area, a positive decision for Blaze
will protect their authority to tax from competition by the states. A decision
in favor of Blaze to block state taxation of certain activities in Indian
Country also removes an impediment to economic development, thereby
increasing a tribe's independent ability to exercise its sovereignty. Thus,
any result will affect whether Indian sovereignty at this nexus of the new
millenium will grow, stagnate, or shrink. The tax implications will reach
not just Blaze or the construction industry, but all other businesses in
Indian Country, including the natural resources industry. Not since the
twin decisions of Merrion'3 and Cotton Petroleum 4 will a Supreme Court
decision have such an important tax impact upon economic activity and
natural resource development in Indian Country.

11. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423,429 (1870) (explaining
that power of taxation for purposes of commonwealth is part of all governmental sovereignty
and is inseparable from it); Gilman v. Sheboygan, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 510,513 (1862) (finding
that "imposition, modification, and removal of taxes, and the exemption of property from
such burdens, is an ordinary exercise of the power of state sovereignty"); Nathan v. Louisiana,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 73, 82 (1850) (holding that the taxing power of the state is an "attribute of
sovereignty" and "where there has been no compact with the Federal government, or cession
of jurisdiction for the purposes specified in the Constitution, this power reaches all the
property and business within the state which are not properly denominated the means of the
general government").
12. See Brendale v. Yakima, 492 U.S. 408,454 (1989), (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,141 (1982)) (upholding a tribe's inherent authority to impose a severance
tax on non-Indian mining activities within the reservation). This taxing authority, even over
non-Indians, is an "inherent power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial
management." Id. at 141. See a/so Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134,
152 (1980) (holding that the "power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and
significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which
the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their
dependent status."); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal permit tax on
nonmember-owned livestock within boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation); Buster v. Wright,
135 F. 947,950 (8th Cir. 1905) (upholding Tnbes permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege
of conducting business within Tribe's borders; the court characterized as "inherent" the
Tribe's "authority...to prescribe the terms upon which non-citizens may transact business
within its borders"). Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that the tribes
retained criminal jurisdiction over tribal offenders as part of the tribes independent
sovereignty).
13. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
14. Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
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This article offers a balanced discussion of both sides of the Blaze
case. By analyzing the arguments presented for and against Blaze, this
article will attempt to lay out the reasoning, interests, and policies
submitted for Supreme Court review. Analysis of past Supreme Court
decisions upon which both parties rely should reveal trends and provide
indications for resolving future tax disputes for business and natural
resource developers in Indian Country. Based upon that analysis, a
prediction on the outcome of the Supreme Court decision is made. This
discussion also explores the policy implications of the decision on future
natural resource developments and business transactions within Indian
Country. As a final offering, this article will point out several legal ways to
avoid taxation in Indian Country without resorting to litigation. Regardless
of the outcome, the way business is conducted within Indian Country will
be profoundly affected. This article is written with the attitude that "[i]f a
man begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content
to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties. " "
PREPARATION AND GROUNDWORK
The Blaze case was born first in New Mexico;16 its identical twin
followed a few years later in Arizona." Blaze submitted the question of
whether a business should pay a state transaction privilege tax (or tax
based upon gross receipts of a business)' for work performed solely within

15. Francis Bacon, Advanceent of Learning, Book I, § V, No. 8; reprinted in Oxford
Dictionary of Quotations 24 (3rd ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
16. See Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation &Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803 (N.M. 1994) (holding
that the state could assess taxes on reservation construction).
17. See State of Arizona v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836 (Ariz. App. 1997) (reversing
the imposition of tax liability for approximately $1.6 million in taxes, interest, and penalties
for its reservation road construction activities).
18. See New Mexico Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-1
to 7-9-89 (Michie 1978):
The purpose of the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act [this article)
is to provide revenue for public purposes by levying a tax on the privilege
of engaging in certain activities within New Mexico and to protect New
Mexico businessmen from the unfair competition that would otherwise
result from the importation into the state of property without payment of a
similar tax.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-2 (Michie 1978). See also Arizona Transaction Privilege Tax, ARIZ. STAT.
§ 42-5008 (1999):
A. There is levied and there shall be collected by the department, for the
purpose of raising public money to be used in liquidating the outstanding
obligations of the state and county governments, to aid in defraying the
necessary and ordinary expenses of the state and the municipalities and
counties in this state, to reduce or eliminate the annual tax levy on property

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

Indian Country. Interestingly, Blaze Construction relied upon the services
of the same attorney19 to bring the case in both states. The attorney
presented virtually identical arguments to each state. Both the New Mexico
and Arizona tax department attorneys' also presented almost identical
grounds for deciding the issues in favor of their states. All parties
addressed the application of the Indian law-federal preemption analysis
articulated by the Supreme Court in White Mountain" and Ramah Navajo.'
As the case matured in New Mexico, all parties began relying upon the
analysis, dicta, and holding from Cotton Petroleum,' decided a few years
earlier, for specific support of their contentions. Each state court took
divergent views of the case law, and the doctrine represented in them, to
arrive at opposing conclusions. The Supreme Court decided to settle this
question.
Many highly intelligent legal minds wrestled with the Blaze
problem in two different states and reasoned two opposite conclusions. In
1994 New Mexico found that in spite of arguments supporting the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine, Blaze was ultimately a federal contractor

for municipal and county purposes and to reduce the levy on property for
public school education, privilege taxes measured by the amount or volume
of business transacted by persons on account of their business activities, and
in the amounts to be determined by the application of rates against values,
gross proceeds of sales or gross income, as the case may be, as prescribed by
this article...
B.If any monies remain after the payments are made for state purposes, as
provided for by subsection A, the remainder of the monies shall be paid into
the state school fund for educational purposes.
C. The tax levied by and collected pursuant to this article...is designated the
'transaction privilege tax.'
Id.
19. Gary Verburg, formerly associated with the firm of Margrave, Celmins & Verburg of
Scottsdale, AZ, represented Blaze Construction in both New Mexico and Arizona. Prior to the
US. Supreme Court granting Arizona's petition for certiorari, Mr. Verburg became the City
Attorney for Glendale, AZ. Bruce Smith and Lat Celmins, from the same firm, prepared the
Supreme Court brief and presented the oral argument. This author wishes to convey
appreciation to all three attorneys for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
20. Frank Katz, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., represented the New Mexico Taxation & Revenue
Department. Patrick Irvine, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., represented the Arizona Department of
Revenue. Patrick Irvine also took the case before the US. Supreme Court for the state of
Arizona. Mr. Irvine's help in the preparation of this article is also sincerely appreciated.
21. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 US. 136 (1980) (holding inapplicable
Arizona's vehicle license and fuel tax on tribal timber harvesting contractor as an obstruction
of federal policy to ensure maximum return from resource development).
22. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (holding
inapplicable state gross receipts tax on construction contractor with Indian school board).
23. Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163 (1989).
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owing the tax like any other federal contractor outside of Indian Country.'
In 1997 the Arizona Court of Appeals, criticizing the New Mexico decision
for not applying established doctrine, found that the principles of Indian
law-federal preemption prohibited the application of an identical tax in
Arizona.2s
Reversing its Court of Appeals, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that Indian law-federal preemption doctrine did not exempt the
taxpayer performing work in Indian Country when it contracted with a
federal agency rather than the Indian tribe or its members. The New
Mexico high court analyzed the facts to find that the "intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine" from United States v. New Mexicoe controlled the
settlement of its case. Additionally, it declared in its holding that the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine, as modified by Cotton Petroleum, did not
require finding preemption in this case even if it were applicable. '
On the other hand, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine prohibited an identical state tax.
Criticizing the New Mexico court for not adhering to the guidance of the
U.S. Supreme Court in White Mountain,' the Arizona court found that the
Indian law-federal preemption analysis was designed for just this kind of
instance where a state asserts its authority over non-member, non-Indian
activities within Indian Country.' Finding that the facts of this case placed
it squarely within the preemption analysis articulated in White Mountain,'
the court engaged in "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake... " The Indian fact-related elements
that compelled the Arizona court to rule in favor of Indian law-federal
preemption were (1) an Indian-owned contracting firm (2) performing
activities exclusively within Indian Country (3) that benefited Indian tribes

(4) who had planning input into the governmental projects (5) for an
agency who had a trust responsibility to the Indians. Therefore, the trust

24. Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803 (N.M. 1994).
25. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836 (Ariz. App. 1997), review
denied, Dec. 16,1997.
26. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). The United States brought a
declaratory judgment action as an intervenor for management contractors of federally-owned
atomic labs to prohibit the collection of gross receipts and compensating taxes by New
Mexico. The Court found that such contractors were not constituent parts of the federal
government; therefore, imposition of the state taxes upon property purchased by and services
performed by the private entities did not infringe federal immunity from state taxation. See
id. at 73941.
27. See Blaze v. Taxation & Revenue, 884 P.2d at 809.
28. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 US. 136 (1980).
29. See Arizona v. Blaze, 947 P.2d at 839.
30. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 US. 136,144-45 (1980).
31. Id. at 145.
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relationship of BIA compelled foreclosure of state tax in order to get the
most mileage out of the limited funds available to spend on Indian
projects.32
THE NEW MEXICO CASE-NEW MEXICO AND COTTON
ARE KING
The split between the two states over the application of taxes began
when the N.M. Supreme Court chose to review the New Mexico Blaze case.
It consolidated two cases decided in the court of appealsa relating to the
same road construction activities in Indian Country for the BIA.s Blaze
Construction and Arco Materials challenged the assessment of gross
receipts tax on their activities within Indian Country. The question
presented by the Taxation and Revenue Department was whether federal
law preempts the imposition of New Mexico taxes upon the receipts of a
contractor building roads for the federal government in Indian Country
under the Federal Lands Highway Program. The New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed the lower court, concluding that Indian law-federal
preemption did not preclude the assessment of the taxes for both Blaze and
Arco.
The New Mexico Supreme Court disposed of the threshold issue
of whether Blaze Construction, an Indian-owned corporation performing
work solely in Indian Country, was per se exempt from state taxation.
Looking to Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville,'e the court

32. See Arizona v. Blaze, 947 P.2d at 841-42.
33. See Blaze Constr. Co. v. New Mexico Taxation &Revenue Dep't, 871 P.2d 1368 (N.M
Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted, 879 P.2d 1197 (N.M. 1993); Arco Materials, Inc. v. New Mexico
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 878 P.2d 330 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, 877 P.2d 1105
(N.ML 1994). Blaze Construction Co. rendered construction services while Arco Materials, Inc.
supplied the paving materials for the same road construction within New Mexico Indian
Country.
34. All road construction activity was conducted pursuant to the Federal Lands Highway
Program Act, 23 U.S.C. § 204 (1994), providing funds to construct and improve roads in
national forests, in national parks, on public lands, and on Indian reservations. See 23 U.S.C.
§ 204(b).
35. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The Supreme
Court held that a state possesses authority to levy cigarette taxes upon Indians living on a
reservation that have no membership affiliation with that reservation's tribe. The Court found
no congressional intent to exempt non-member reservation residents from state taxation even
though non-member Indians fall within the definition of Indian for purposes of Indian
Reorganization Act. "For most practical purposes those (non-member] Indians stand on the
same footing as non-Indians..." Id. at 161. Imposition of state tax upon non-member Indian
residents did not contravene tribal sovereignty since non-members were not constituents of
the governing tribe. A state's interest in taxing these purchasers outweighed any tribal interest
in preventing the tax. See id.
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concluded that the status of Blaze, as a 100 percent Indian-owned
contractor not affiliated with any of the tribes in question, did not
automatically exempt it from state taxation 3 6 Finding that the lack of tribal
affiliation by Blaze with any of the New Mexico tribes prevented exemption
from state taxation, New Mexico harmonized its common law with the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Colville.'
The New Mexico high court then dismissed the Indian law-federal
preemption analysis performed by its appellate court as inapplicable to the
facts. Instead, the court chose to follow the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity articulated in United States v. New Mexico, allowing
nondiscriminatory state taxation of entities that contract with the federal
government. ' In United States v. New Mexico, the federal government
sought state tax immunity for its contractors connected with the
management of certain federal laboratories. The Supreme Court
unanimously held that states could tax the gross receipts of federal
contracting entities without offending the notion of federal supremacy and
intergovernmental tax immunity." Accordingly, the New Mexico court
concluded that when Blaze contracted with the BIA, a federal agency, it
became a federal contractor subject to state taxation. Therefore, there was
no need to apply the currently existing Indian law-federal preemption
analysis to decide the issues presented by Blaze.'

36. Based upon the holding in Colville, the New Mexico Supreme Court took the
opportunity to expressly overrule two prior state cases: Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 531 P.2d
1234 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that Comanche tribal member living on Navajo
Reservation not liable for state income tax withholding) and Eastern Navajo Indus., Inc. v.
Bureau of Revenue, 552 P.2d 805 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that state gross receipt
taxation of housing corporation formed under state law with 51% Indian ownership and at
instigation of Navajo Tribal Council as an illegal interference with Indian self-government).
See Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803, 805 (N.M. 1994).
37. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 134.
38. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982) (explaining that tax
immunity for the federal sovereign engages only when the levy falls directly on the United
States itself, one of its agencies, or a closely connected instrumentality). This view is in
accordance with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), of forestalling "dashing
sovereignty" by prohibiting states from laying demands directly on the federal government.
See also United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964) (finding that federal contractors are neither
agents nor incorporated into the government in a manner that makes them immune to state
taxation); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943) (holding that state may not lay a tax
directly upon the U.S.); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) (upholding state sales
tax on federal vending contractor); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937)
(overruling a century of precedents to allow state gross receipts tax on services of a federal
contractor).
39. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 US. at 744.
40. See Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P2d 803,806 (N.M. 1994).
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New Mexico found unpersuasive the rationale that the special
relationship of the BIA to Indian tribes in the performance of integral
governmental functions engaged the application of the Indian law-federal
preemption analysis. It stated that
[tjo equate Indian tribes and the BIA in this way ignores the
fact that tribal governments have retained an element of
sovereignty separate and distinct from the federal
government .... While the BIA acts in an administrative
capacity on the tribes behalf, it is not synonymous with the
tribe; it [the BIA] exercises federal, rather than tribal,
authority when entering into contracts for road construction
on tribal land.4'
The New Mexico Supreme Court grounded the existence of this
distinctive sovereignty between the federal government and Indian tribes
on two sources, the White Mountain cased and Felix S.Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law.' Ultimately, the court concluded the appellate court
erred in two ways; first, in finding the BIA acted as a tribal partner when
contracting for Indian Country road construction, and second, in applying
the Indian law-federal preemption doctrine.
In disagreeing with the appellate court's application of the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine, the New Mexico high court declared that
the U.S. Supreme Court had never applied the doctrine to this set of facts.
It observed that the U.S. Supreme Court applied this doctrine only in "cases
where [non-Indian] contracts were made or business was conducted
directly with Indian tribes or tribal members."" Differentiating the facts at

41. Id. at 806 (citations omitted).
42. See White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (recognizing that
Indian tribes do not possess full attributes of sovereignty, but still govern their own internal
and social relations).
43.

FEuxS. COHEN'S HANDOOKOFFEDERAL INDIAN LAw 232 (Rennard Strickland et al.

eds., 1982) (observing the consistent federal recognition of Indian tribes as separate
independent political communities exercising powers of self-government).
44. Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803,805 (N.M. 1994). See,
e.g., Cotton Petroleum Co., Inc. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163,186-87 (1982) (applying doctrine
where state taxed oil and gas production on reservation land by non-Indian contractor with
tribe); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 US. 832, 842 (1982) (applying
doctrine where state taxed gross receipts of non-Indian construction contractor's fees paid by

Indian tribal school board for building reservation school); White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 US. 136,151 (1980) (applying doctrine where state imposed motor carrier license
and use fuel taxes to company engaged in timber harvesting commerce with Indian tribal

enterprise on reservation); Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 US. 160,165 (1980)
(applying doctrine where state taxed sale of farm machinery sold to Indian tribe);

McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,165 (1973) (applying doctrine where state
taxed personal income of on-reservation Indians who derived entire income from reservation
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bar, it found that "Blaze and Arco contracted directly with the BIA, an
agency of the federal government, rather than with an Indian tribe or with
individual tribal members.' The court found no direct connection with a
tribe or tribal members to activate the application of the Indian law-federal
preemption analysis. Moreover, the court declared that the lower court
misapplied the Indian law-federal preemption doctrine. The court detailed
how Cotton Petroleum modified the doctrine and the proper application of
it to the facts at hand." Thus, the court concluded that the case should be
decided by the application of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine
articulated in United States v. New Mexico.4
THE ARIZONA CASE-ARIZONA HEAT BLAZES COTON
In Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze ConstructionCo. (Arizona
Blaze), the Court of Appeals determined whether or not any federal statutes
preempted, by expression or implication, the assessment of the state's
transaction privilege tax on the gross receipts of Blaze Construction.' In
making its determination, the Arizona court found certain parts of the fact
pattern to be determinative. The court noted that the role played by each
of the three sovereigns (federal, tribal, and state) was relevant to its analysis
and decision.49
The federal government authorized the BIA Branch of Roads to
determine, with the advice of the tribes, the specific roads to be built with
Federal Lands Highway'Program funds. The BIA Branch of Roads
allocated the amount of funding for each reservation construction project.
The BIA Branch of Roads designed and issued the specification packages

sources); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 US. 685,691 (1965) (applying
doctrine to bar jurisdiction to sue in state court for non-Indian retail trading post conducting
business with Indians on Navajo reservation).
45. Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation &Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803,806 (N.M. 1994).
46. See id. at 806-09.
47. See id. at 806.
48. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836 (Ariz. App. 1997). It may

help to understand the issue by tracking the differing decisions from various hearings. The
Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) hearing officer, and later its director, denied the
Blaze tax protest on its merits. However, on administrative appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals
vacated the director's assessment of the transaction privilege tax. The ADOR appealed to tax
court, which held the tax applicable based upon the Arizona precedent of Department of
Revenue v. Hane ConstructionCo., 564 P.2d 932 (Ariz. App. 1977) (holding that imposition of
transaction privilege tax upon BIA contractor performing concrete lining of irrigation canals
on an Indian reservation was not precluded by federal regulation or federal law nor was it an
impermissible attempt to tax Indian income, property, or lands). Blaze appealed its adverse
decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Arizona v. Blaze, 947 P.2d at 838.
49.

See Arizona v.Blaze, 947 P.2d at 838.
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for each reservation road project. The BIA awarded the contracts and
supervised the construction projects to completion. '
The individual tribes assisted in the prioritizing, planning, and
determination of particular road construction projects for their respective
reservations. In addition, approximately 85 percent of the workers
employed by the construction projects were Indians sent by tribal
employment referral services51 Even though Blaze used the state's
highways to transport its equipment to different reservation job sites, it
performed all road construction activities entirely within each of the
reservations. The court noted that although Blaze used the state's
highways, Blaze paid motor vehicle registration fees, motor carrier taxes,
and use fuel taxes to Arizona during its equipment transporting activities.
By contrast, the court noted that "Arizona did not participate in
planning or developing any of Blaze's projects" on the reservations.' In
addition, the court enumerated the paucity of Arizona's participation in
other aspects. Arizona issued no permits, performed no safety inspections,
supplied no labor referrals, and provided no maintenance or law
enforcement services for any of the projects.' Although Arizona received
undiminished federal funding to build, maintain, and repair certain
reservation roads throughout the state, the court observed that none of the
roads at issue were the responsibility of the state."
Blaze contended that Indian law-federal preemption analysis
"applied to the assertions of state authority over the activities of nonIndians on Indian reservations," thereby precluding the Arizona
transaction privilege tax. ' The Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR)
argued that the rationale from the New Mexico B/aze decision controlled the
determination of its case." The Arizona court found that resolution of the
matter rested squarely within the modem formulation of the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
White Mountain.' Moreover, the court of appeals rejected ADOR's attempt
to distinguish the direct Indian tribe-to-private contractor relationship,
crucial to the U.S. Supreme Court's White Mountain decision, from the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 837.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 837.
See id. at 837,843.
See id. at 837-38.
Id.at 838.
See id.
See id. at 839.
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present federal-to-private contractor relationship." Instead, the Arizona
appellate court declared that "nothing in the [Supreme] Court's application
of that analysis in White Mountain suggests that it implicitly follows any
such limitation. The identity of the nominal contracting party, in fact,
played no part in the inquiry." '
Relying upon the guidance expressed in White Mountain, the
Arizona court embarked upon a "particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.""' The court emphasized that
activities were conducted solely within the reservation under a
comprehensive federal scheme, facts common to both this case and White
Mountain. "[Eiqually important, the [state had] been unable to identify any
regulatory function or service performed.. .that would justify the
assessment of taxes..."' Quoting White Mountain, the court rejected
ADOR's assertion that "they [the states] may assess taxes on non-Indians
engaged in commerce on the reservation whenever there is no express

congressional statement to the contrary" as "simply not the law."'
Moreover, Arizona criticized the New Mexico Blaze decision for
"overlook[ing] the focus of Indian law[-federal] preemption analysis ...and
the consequent potential that state taxation of those [non-Indian
commercial] activities will conflict with federal or tribal interests reflected
in federal law.""
The Arizona court's inquiry sought to determine if the imposition
of the state tax "interfere[d] or [was] incompatible with federal and tribal
interests reflected in federal law." Blaze claimed that its situation was
"legally indistinguishable"" from either White Mountain or Ramah Navajo.

59. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brarker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), Arizona was attempting
to tax a non-Indian sub-contractor of a White Mountain Apache tribal enterprise (Fort Apache
Tribal Corporation, FATCO). The tribal enterprise contracted with the BIA for timber
harvesting operations on its reservation. The United States owned the timber for benefit of the
tribe under the supervision of the BIA. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 585 P.2d
891,894 (Ariz. App. 1978).
60. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836, 838 (Ariz. App. 1997).
61. Id. (quoting White Mountain, 448 US. at 144-45) (holding that in the absence of
compelling state interest, state motor vehicle license and use fuel taxes were not applicable

to timber harvesting contractor for Indian tribe and interfered with the comprehensive federal
scheme).
62.
63.
64.
65.

Arizona v. Blaze, 947 P.2d at 839.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 840; (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 US. 324,334 (1983))

(holding that in the absence of strong state regulatory interest, the state did not have
concurrent jurisdiction over state hunting and fishing laws because such regulation was
preempted by a comprehensive federal and tribal scheme as well as congressional
commitment to encourage tribal self-sufficiency and economic development).
66. Arizona v. Blaze, 947 P.2d at 840.
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Blaze reasoned that the nature of federal statutory provisions and
regulations governing Indian-controlled reservation school construction in
Ramah Navajo was very similar to the BIA regulations governing its road
construction. It argued that "safe, passable roads [were] necessary to the
success of the BIA's federally-mandated efforts to provide shelter, medical
services, education and other social services to reservation Indians." 6' Blaze
identified the BIA road regulations, important for the preemption holding
in White Mountain, as the same regulations applicable to it while building
the roads in question. Accordingly, Arizona's contracting privilege tax
must be "incompatible with the federal and tribal interest in channeling all
available funding toward building and improving reservation roads. " '
Therefore, the court concluded that the principles of Indian law-federal
preemption analysis prohibited, by implication, Arizona's transaction
privilege tax on the activities of Blaze Construction in Indian Country.'
THE COTTON CONNECTION
Both the New Mexico and Arizona decisions relied upon the
analysis, dicta, and holding in Cotton Petroleum to support opposite
conclusions. The New Mexico Supreme Court did not go so far as to agree
with its state tax department's assertion that the "legislative intent"
approach from Cotton Petroleum supplanted the "balancing of interests"
approach from White Mountain andRamah Navajo, only that it modified the
approach The court recognized that "when 'deciding whether state
taxation of on-reservation activity has been preempted, we look primarily
at congressional intent' and that our nation's history of tribal sovereignty
provides a necessary backdrop to the analytical process.""1 In performing
its own Indian law-federal preemption analysis, the New Mexico court
acknowledged that broad federal policies of encouraging tribal selfsufficiency and economic development may have been correctly
considered; however, standing alone they were "insufficient for finding
preemption" of a state tax?2
On the other hand, the Arizona court insisted that Cotton Petroleum
achieved its result utilizing the "modem formulation" of Indian
law-federal preemption analysis articulated in White Mountain and Ramah

67.

Id. at 841.

68. /d.
69. See id. at 846.
70. See Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803,806-07 (N.M. 1994).
71. Blaze v. Taxation &Revenue, 884 P.2d at 808 (quoting Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation &
Revenue Dep't of New Mexico, 871 P.2d 1368, 1371 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Cotton

Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163,176 (1989)).
72. Blaze Constr. Co. v Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803,808 (N.M. 1994).
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Navajo.73 It interpreted Cotton Petroleum as requiring some state activity or
regulatory interest to justify imposition of state taxes within Indian
Country. 4 The Arizona court noted that Cotton Petroleum distinguished the
circumstances in White Mountain and Ramah Navajo. The latter were
decided "on the basis that the federal regulatory schemes applicable in
those cases were comprehensive, the economic burden of the taxes fell on
the tribes and the taxing authority had asserted no legitimate regulatory
interests that might justify the challenged taxes."" Pointing to a distinction
found in Cotton Petroleum that it was "not a case in which the state has had
nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it,"' the appellate
court contrasted and criticized ADOR for not having "anything to do with
the on-reservation activity, in this case building and improving reservation
roads, other than taxing it."7 Moreover, the Arizona court insisted that
"Cotton Petroleumdid not abandon the requirement of White Mountain and
Ramah Navajo that there exists a relationship between the services the state
provides and the on-reservation activities it seeks to tax."78
In direct contrast, the New Mexico court found it unnecessary for
the state to "identify a regulatory function or service performed that would
justify the tax" " even though required by the Supreme Court opinion in
both White Mountain and Ramah Navajo.' Instead, the New Mexico court
declared that Cotton Petroleum rejected this very argument and abandoned
this "quid pro quo theory of taxation." 1 New Mexico quoted extensively
from the text of Cotton Petroleum to underline the historical reasoning
connected with this conclusion.
There is no requirement under the Due Process Clause that
the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a
particular activity must be reasonably related to the value of
the services provided to the activity.. .Nothing is more
familiar in taxation than the imposition of tax upon a class or

73. See Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836, 838 (Ariz. App.
1997).
74. See id. at 845.
at 842
75. Id.
76. id. at 843 (quoting Cotton Petroleum Co. Inc. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186
(1989)).
77. Id. at 843 (quotations omitted).
78. Id. at 845.
79. Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803,808 (N.M. 1994).
80. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,150 (1980) (finding that
a state's general interest in raising revenue insufficient justification to support imposition of
state tax); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 US. 832,845 (1982) (same).
81. Blaze v. Taxation & Revenue, 884 P.2d at 808.
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upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its
expenditure....
A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we have said,
a means of distributing the burden of the cost of government.
The only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally
entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges
of living in an organized society, established and
safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purposes.0
New Mexico agreed with the rationale in Cotton Petroleum that taxation
required no direct relation to services, but was "a means of distributing the
cost of government among the general population, including its Indian
citizens."' Therefore, it held that its Court of Appeals should have heeded
this modification of the White Mountain and Ramah Navajo Indian
law-federal preemption analysis by the superceding Cotton Petroleum
opinion.8
As a counterpoint, Arizona found further support for its decision
against imposing state taxes in the recognition by Cotton Petroleumof New
Mexico's substantial provision of services to the taxpayer and the tribe. The
Arizona court pointed out that, in Cotton Petroleum,New Mexico "regulated
the spacing and mechanical integrity of the wells located on the
reservation."' In comparison, the Arizona court acknowledged that its
state provided some educational and social services to reservations;
however, Arizona could not claim a "direct connection" between provision
of these state services to the road construction activity at issue." It also
equated the comprehensive federal regulations, important to the rationale
of the White Mountain decision, with the virtually identical regulations
governing the road improvements performed under federal contract by
Blaze. It concluded that the lack of directly related services by the state of
Arizona, combined with the regulatory similarities in White Mountain, did

not support the state's "generalized interest in raising revenue.. .sufficient
to permit its proposed intrusion into the federal regulatory scheme...."'
Thus, for Arizona these factors tipped the scales toward the preemption of
taxation of Blaze's construction activities.

82. Id. (quoting Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 190) (internal citations and footnotes
omitted)).
83. Id. at 809.

84. See id.
85. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 947 P.2d 836,845 (Ariz. App. 1997)
(quoting Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185-86).
86. See id. at 846.
87. Id. at 846 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 US. 136,150 (1980)).
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The New Mexico Supreme Court noted that the analysis in Cotton
Petroleumalso addressed Blaze's argument regarding the economic burden
to the tribe of taxing the revenue of a contractor conducting business in
Indian Country. It agreed with Cotton Petroleum that "indirect,
insubstantial, or marginal burdens on tribal interests do not support" an
exemption of state tax.' The New Mexico court concurred by analogy that,
based on the modified Indian law-federal preemption analysis of Cotton
Petroleum, the taxation of a contractor for the federal government, unlike
direct taxation of tribal economic activities, did not economically burden
the tribe. By applying the intergovernmental immunity doctrine recognized
in United States v. New Mexico, New Mexico refused to immunize Blaze as
a federal contractor from the state's nondiscriminatory taxation.' Thus, the
state's taxation was allowable in its case because Blaze was a federal
contractor and the economic burden of the state tax fell upon the federal
government."
By supporting its conclusion with the reasoning and holding of
both Cotton Petroleum and United States v. New Mexico, the New Mexico
Supreme Court recognized the subsequent influence of Cotton Petroleumon
the evolution of the Indian law-federal preemption doctrine previously
established in White Mountain and Ramah Navajo. In contrast, the Arizona
Court of Appeals relied almost exclusively upon the reasoning and holding
of White Mountain and Ramah Navajo to arrive at its conclusion that Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine precluded its state tax assessment on
Blaze's activities in Indian Country. By concentrating its attention on
references to White Mountain and Ramah Navajo within the Cotton Petroleum
opinion, the Arizona Court of Appeals distinguished the rationale and
holding of Cotton Petroleum to support its conclusion. In doing so, the
Arizona court failed to recognize that the Supreme Court receded from the
apogee of expansive interpretation of the Indian law-federal preemption
doctrine represented by White Mountain and Ramah Navajo. Understanding
this change in the Indian law-federal preemption doctrine requires a closer
look at the Cotton Petroleum opinion. Combining this exploration with
newer case law available to Arizona will inform the Supreme Court's
decision and its future implications.

88. Blaze Constr. Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 884 P.2d 803, 809d1 (NI 1994) (citing
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 18687).
89. See Blaze v. Taxation & Revenue, 884 P.2d at 806 (citing United States v. New Mexico,
455 U.S. 720,735,741 (1982)).
90. See id. at 809 n.4.
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PICKING MORE COTTON
The Cotton Petroleum court declared that without more explicit
direction from Congress, or some special factors as were present in White
Mountain and Ramah Navajo, it would not preempt state taxation. To
preempt state taxation because of indirect burdens to a tribe "would be to
return to the pre-1937 doctrine of intergovernmental immunity" already
"long-discarded and thoroughly repudiated."" One of the prime identical
"special factors" influencing the White Mountain and Ramah Navajo
holdings distinguished by Cotton Petroleum was that "the economic burden
of the tax ultimately fell upon the Tribe."' The Cotton Petroleum court
found that absence of this singular distinction placed the issue squarely
within the purview of current intergovernmental immunity doctrine.
Section III of the Cotton Petroleumopinion provides the rationale for
the Court's aversion to return to a thoroughly repudiated
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine." The court instructed that
"[d]uring the first third of this century, this Court frequently invalidated
state taxes that arguably imposed an indirect economic burden on the
Federal Government or its instrumentalities by application of the
'intergovernmental immunity' doctrine."' It noted that under past
interpretation of that doctrine, the income of a non-Indian oil lessee of
Indian trust land was immune from state taxation because the lessee
contracted with the federal government and was therefore considered an
instrumentality of the federal government."5 Justice Stevens crowned the
Gillespie v. Oklahoma decision as the zenith of that line of broad
interpretation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine for Indian
interests." The Court traced the decline of the federal instrumentality
doctrine, recalling the James v. Dravo ContractingCo. decision;' which "took
a substantial step" in the direction of repudiating the previously broad
interpretation of intergovernmental tax immunity for federal interests in

91. Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,187 (1989).
92. Id.at 184.
93. See id. at 181-84.
94. Id.at 173-74.
95. See Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 506 (1922) (finding that non-Indian oil
leasing of Indian trust lands was an instrumentality of the federal government and, as such,
the lessee's income was immune from state taxation as "a direct hamper upon the effort of the
United States to make the best terms for its wards").
%. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174.
97. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (rejecting the argument that a
nondiscriminatory state tax on a federal contractor should be invalid because the economic
burden fell upon the federal government).
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1937." In 1938, Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corporation" "squarely
overruled Gillespie," and ever since "oil and gas lessees operating on Indian
reservations were subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation as long as
Congress did not act affirmatively to preempt the state taxes."100
It is the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and its
inseparable connection between Indian interests and federal interests that
supports the rationale of the Cotton Petroleumholding. The Cotton Petroleum
court encapsulated its logic by declaring "it is well settled that, absent
express congressional authorization, a State cannot tax the United States
directly." 1 1 Moreover, "the tax immunity of the United States is shared by
the Indian tribes for whose benefit the United States holds reservation
lands in trust." 'n Accordingly, "[u]nder current [intergovernmental tax
immunity] doctrine.. .a State can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private
parties with whom the United States or an Indian tribe does business, even
though the financial burden of the tax may fall on the United States or
tribe.""0 Therefore, when a third party contracts with the federal or tribal
government, a state may impose a nondiscriminatory tax on the private
contractor's activities.
Finding that the production of private oil leases in Indian Country
was "not 'automatically exempt from state taxation,'"' the Court reasoned
that any grant of tax immunity for Cotton Petroleum Corporation must rest
on one of two foundations. It must be expressed, or plainly implied, by
congressional intent or it must be unconstitutional as a multiple tax
burden. This reliance on either legislative expression or constitutional

98. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174-75.
99. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 US. 376,386-87 (1938) (explaining that
immunity from non-discriminatory state taxes cannot be supported by merely theoretical
conceptions of interference with the functions of government because the taxes fall upon a
government contractor).
100. Cotton Petroleum, 490 US. at 175 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S.
342 (1949) (holding non-Indian lessees of mineral rights in allotted and restricted Indian lands
were not immunized federal instrumentalities against state nondiscriminatory gross
production tax on petroleum produced from such land, unless Congress affirmatively acted
to the contrary).
101. Cotton Petroleum,490 U.S. at 175 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819)).
102. Id. (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 US. 759,764 (1985).
103. Id. (citing Blackfeet Tribe, 471 US. at 765). See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 523 (1988) (explaining that "states can never tax the United States directly but can tax any
private parties with whom it does business, even though the financial burden falls on the
United States, as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with
whom it deals").
104. Cotton Petroleum Co., Inc. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,175 (1989) (quoting Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US. at 150).
105. See Cotton Petroleum,490 U.S. at 175-76.
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difficulty parallels the Court's holding in United States v. New Mexico seven
years earlier.' Thus, the Cotton Petroleum opinion signals the intent of the
Court to narrow the interpretation of the Indian law-federal preemption
doctrine and to reconnect it with other areas of federal preemption analysis
requiring similarly clear congressional expression.
The Court examined all of the relevant Indian law for indications
that the oil lessees were dearly immunized from state taxation. From the
outset of their discussion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the assertion
by Cotton Petroleum attorneys that state taxes were, by implication,
preempted by broad federal policies to protect tribal self-government and
to improve reservation economies.' More particularly, the Court found no
express congressional intent to immunize non-Indian lessees in the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA)." However, the Court did clarify the
limit of its holding in Blackfeet Tribe' to prevent state taxation of only
"Indian royalty income" as a frustration of the purposes of IMLA leases.1
Indeed, Justice Stevens found it "quite remarkable, indeed
unfathomable.. .to suggest that Congress intended to remove all stateimposed obstacles to profitability..."' Echoing a discussion from
Colville," it further noted that a permissive reading of the IMLA for broad
policy goals, or for resolution of ambiguities in favor of tribal
independence, provided "no evidence.. .that Congress intended to remove
all barriers to profit maximization" as argued by the oil company."
Instead, it found that Congress enacted the IMLA only to harmonize
mineral leasing matters with the Indian Reorganization Act"" and to
provide regulatory uniformity in the leasing of public domain and tribal
lands." Thus, failing to find any tax immunization by specific

106. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 US. 720,735-36 (1982).
107. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 US. at 177.
108. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,25 US.C. §§ 396a to 396g (1994). In fact, the court
observed that, while Gillespie was prevailing doctrine, Congress expressly waived immunity
from state taxation of oil and gas lessees operating on Indian reservations in the Indian Oil
Act of 1927,44 Stat. 1347,25 US.C. § 398a (1994). See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 181-82. The
court noted this action as an example of the ability of Congress to clearly express itself on the
subject of taxation within Indian Country.
109. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,766-67 (1985).
110. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 US. at 179.
111. Id. at 179.
112. Washington v. Confederated Tnbes of Colville, 447 US. 134, 158 (1980) ("[W]e
perceive no intent on the part of Congress to authorize the Tribes to preempt otherwise valid
state taxes.").
113. Cotton Petroleum,490 US. at 180.
114. Wheeler-Howard Act, Pub. L. No. 383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 US.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
115. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 US. at 178.
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congressional authorization, the Court launched into its Indian law-federal
preemption analysis.
The Cotton PetroleumCourt established new ground rules for its
analysis of the Indian law-federal preemption in an important
doctrinal116
footnote. After refusing to consider any implied prohibition of state
taxation of non-member lessees' Indian Country activities in the IMLA, the
Court extended this policy to include legislation previously relied upon by
the Court to support deference to tribal interests. The Court emphatically
eliminated from consideration any implied congressional support for the
preemption of state taxation from the Indian Reorganization Act,1 7 the
Indian Financing Act of 1974,"1 or the Indian Self-Determination and

Education Assistance Act of 1975.119 The Court declared that "[a]lthough
these statutes 'evidence to varying degrees a congressional concern with
fostering tribal self-government and economic development,' they no more
express a congressional intent to pre-empt state taxation of oil and gas
lessees than does the 1938 [IMLA] Act.""z Moreover, the Court observed
that Congress could and had acted in this arena by referring to the
expressed tax exemption for certain Indian producers in the Crude Oil
Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.121 Hence, the Court dearly receded from its
previously broad interpretation of federal legislation that found a general
preemptive effect against state interests in the taxation of non-Indian
activities in Indian Country.
The Court's opinion exemplified its determination to require
congressional authorization for tax immunization. In addressing the
multiple tax burden argument by Cotton Petroleum, the Court reaffirmed
that three sovereigns will have the potential to levy taxes when business
activity takes place in Indian Country.1" In addition, the Court declared
that Congress had the "undoubted power to prohibit taxation.. .by the
Tribe, by the State, or by both, but since it had not exercised that power,

116. See id. at 183 n.14.
117. Wheeler-Howard Act, Pub. L. No. 383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461479 (1994)).
118. Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-262,88 Stat 77 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
119. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 & 42 US.C.).
120. Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,183 n.14 (1989) (internal citations
omitted).
121. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-223,94 Stat. 229 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
122. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 188 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville, 447 U.S. 134,134 (1980)) (finding that the "Indian tribe did not oust State of power
to impose cigarette tax upon on-reservation sales to non-Indian customers by imposing its
own tax on transaction").
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concurrent taxing jurisdiction" existed over the on-reservation activities.zI
The Court concluded that "[u]nless and until Congress provides otherwise,
each of the other two sovereigns has taxing jurisdiction" over non-Indian
activity.' This discussion delivered a strong message that the Court
required clear congressional intent as a foundation to support any Indian
law-federal preemption analysis. Therefore, Cotton Petroleumrepresents the
definitive ebb in the flow of Supreme Court decisions that promote the
achievement of federal Indian legislation by broadly interpreting
congressional intent.2s
Ultimately, the Court explored the possibility of constitutional
limitations to bar state taxation of Indian Country activities. In addressing
the Commerce Clause arguments, the Court contrasted the distinct
application of the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses."
Noting the uniform position taken by tribal amicus curiaebriefs that "Indian
tribes are not States within the meaning of the Commerce Clause," the
Court concurred that the Constitution "no more admits of treating Indian
tribes as states than of treating foreign nations as States. " ' It found that all
taxable activity in the case occurred entirely within the bounds of the same
reservation in the same state thereby preventing the apportionment of taxes
as required by current Interstate Commerce Clause doctrine. For these
reasons, the Cotton Petroleum Court declined to apply any doctrine
developed in the context of regulating commerce "among" the mutually
exclusive territorial jurisdictions of the states to trade "with" Indian
tribes.' Justice Stevens, quoting from White Mountain, reiterated that
"[tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the form and
nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of
123. Cotton Petroleum,490 U.S. at 189.
124. Id. at 189.
125. See Oswald Graham, Do the States Have Too Much Taxing Power over American Indians?,
15 STATE TAX NOTES 831 (1998) ("Cotton Petroleum is one of the definitive cases of the
preemption era").
126. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3 (-Congress shall have the power... [to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."). See McLeod
v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327,330 (1944); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)

(explaining that the function of the Interstate Commerce Clause is to promote free trade
among the states). See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (declaring the
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary authority
to legislate in the field of Indian affairs); FaLX S. COHN'S HANDOOK OF FEDEML INDIAN LAW
207-08 & nn.2, 3,9-11 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
127. Cotton Petroleum Co., Inc. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163, 191 (1989) (quoting
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,18 (1831) ("The objects to which the power of

regulating commerce might be directed, are divided Into three distinct classes-foreign
nations, the several states, and Indian Tribes. When forming this article, the convention
considered them as entirely distinct.").

128. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 US. at 192.
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pre-emption that are properly applied to the other."1 29 Thus, the Court
flatly refused to entertain any grounds to find its well-developed Interstate
Commerce Clause doctrine analogous to the state taxation of Indian
Country activity by non-Indians via the Indian Commerce Clause.
NEW MEXICO & COTTON SMOTHER THE BLAZE
Blaze Construction owes state taxes. Blaze cannot sustain the tax
immunity argument for several reasons. Blaze is a federal contractor, and
thus is unable to wrap itself in federal-tribal immunity not specifically
granted by Congress. Applying the general rule of tax immunity from
United States v. New Mexico promotes judicial economy and taxing
predictability by requiring Congress to assert any exemptions.' Cotton
Petroleum supports the application of this general rule to non-Indian
activities in Indian Country. Moreover, the unanimous decision in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation 31 relied on the "legal
incidence" test utilized in United States v. New Mexico as the basis for its
holding. Therefore, the Supreme Court must validate the rationale and
holding of New Mexico Blaze by clarifying the Indian law-federal
preemption interpretation found in White Mountain and Ramah Navajo,
upon which Arizona Blaze relied.
Based on the analysis of Cotton Petroleum alone, predicting the
Supreme Court decision would be somewhat difficult. After all, we must
not ignore that Court's admonition that the Indian law-federal preemption
test "is a flexible one sensitive to the particular state, federal, and tribal
interests involved."' 2 It is this very flexibility that has made the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine difficult for practitioners to apply with
any degree of certainty. However, we have the benefit of recent Supreme

129. Id. at 192-93 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 US. 136, 143
(1980)). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority's conclusion that,
for the purposes of the Interstate Commerce Clause, an Indian tribe should not to be equated
with a State. See id. at 193 n.1. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 74344 (1982) (harmonizing its
decision with the recognition that Congress endorsed the same principle in its repeal of the
last sentence of § 9(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which barred local taxation of Atomic
Energy Commission activities "[Clonstitutional immunity does not extend to cost-plus-fixedfee contractors of the Federal Government, but is limited to taxes imposed directly upon the
United States." S. REP. No. 83-694, at 3 (1953)).
131. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (holding that
state fuel tax levied on tribal retail outlet categorically barred even though economic burden
of tax shifted to consumer).
132. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184, (citing Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 458 US. 832,838 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,145
(1980)).
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Court decisions in this field that document the Court's continued insistence
on congressional guidance to find tax exemptions and to promote
predictability. In fact, Oklahoma v. Chickasaw Nation sought increased
predictability for state taxation within Indian Country as an objective.'3
Thus, when considered in light of Cotton Petroleum, these factors provide
a broader information base from which to extrapolate predictable taxation
case outcomes.
From this vantage, Cotton Petroleum dearly establishes that White
Mountain and Ramah Navajo were the high water mark of broad
interpretation of federal legislation to support the Indian law-federal
preemption of state taxation activities within Indian Country. The New
Mexico Supreme Court recognized Cotton Petroleum as a path-marking
decision in its ruling. New Mexico anchored its holding upon the solid
foundations of United States v. New Mexico and Cotton Petroleum. The
unanimous opinion in United States v. New Mexico rested on the general
rule that federal contractors had not enjoyed tax immunity under federal
common law doctrine since 1937.1 Moreover, that opinion required
Congress to expressly immunize its federal contractors from state taxation
if so desiredL15 Cotton Petroleum extended this same obligation to include
state taxation of activities of non-Indian private contractors working for an
Indian tribe in Indian Country.'3 The New Mexico Blaze decision recognized
this connection in allowing state taxes upon a federal contractor's activities
in Indian Country.
The Cotton Petroleum ruling also corrected a tax immunity anomaly
that existed between the United States v. New Mexico and Ramah Navajo
decisions.' 7 In United States v. New Mexico, the Court declined to validate
the argument that state taxation of federal contractors symbolically shifted
the economic burden of the tax to the federal sovereign. It diminished the
relevance of the "economic burden" test, finding instead that the legal
incidence of the state tax fell upon the federal contractor. ' However,
Ramah Navajo looked beyond the legal incidence of the tax on the tribe's

133. See ChickasawNation, 515 U.S. at 460.
134. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 US. 720,731-32 (1982) (quoting James v. Dravo
Contracting, 302 US. 134,161 (1937)). Justice Blackmun, extensively reviewing the history of
tax immunity, traced the modem analysis to the James v. Draw ContractingCo. decision noting
that it "marked a major change in course" regarding the intergovernmental immunity
doctrine by "overruling, sub silentia,a century of precedents." Id.
135. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 737-38.
136. See supratext accompanying notes 91-129.
137. The Ramah Navajo decision accorded greater tax immunity to a dependent tribal
organization than the Court accorded to the federal government in United States v. New
Mexico. See Ramah Navajo, 458 U.S. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. See, United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720,735 n.11 (1980).
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contractor to find the economic burden falling upon the tribal entity. 9
Cotton Petroleum avoided using the "legal incidence" test by finding no
direct economic burden upon the Indian tribe. It found only an indirect and
insubstantial burden to the achievement of federal policy." The lengthy
discussion of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.. was the

Court's way of harmonizing any immunity from state taxation for triballyconnected parties with the tax immunity held by the federal government
and correcting the anomaly created by Ramah Navajo. It linked the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine to the "generalized notions of federal
supremacy" from United States v. New Mexico.' Accordingly, Cotton
Petroleum found no economic burden to the federal-tribal entity and
virtually no burden upon the achievement of federal policy. This finding
precluded any basis to bar state taxation by application of the Indian
law-federal preemption analysis. Therefore, the Cotton Petroleum Court
narrowed considerably the special effect that broad Indian-related federal
legislation would have on its future preemption analysis.
The Court bound immunization from state taxation of activities
within Indian Country more closely to pure federal preemption doctrine
with the Cotton Petroleumdecision. The inference behind its recession from
according special status to tribal entities when determining immunity from
state taxation was grounded on the perceived source of that tribal
immunity. Both the federal and tribal tax "immunities derive from
precisely the same source-the supremacy of federal law .....,, When the
Court adopted the sentiment of United States v. New Mexico that the legal
incidence of the state tax was more relevant than its economic burden in
determining federal tax immunity, it became untenable to maintain
previous intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as a means to insulate
federal operations.'" Arguably, there are many times when federal and
tribal operations or interests are indistinguishable. This notion coupled
with the Court's preference to use federal preemption as a means to afford
tribal entities protection from state taxation since McClanahanv. Arizona,"
makes it logically attractive to equate tribal tax immunity with federal tax
immunity. Consequently, if Indian tribes enjoyed the same privileges of a
broad federal intergovernmental immunity from state taxation, and the
Court narrowed federal intergovernmental immunity to exclude federal
contractors as beneficiaries, then non-Indian contractors working in Indian
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Ramah Navajo, 458 U.S. at 844 n.8.
See Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163,187 (1989).
See id. at 173-87.
United States v. New Mexico, 455 US. at 730.
Ramah Navajo, 458 U.S. at 857 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 735 n.11.
See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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Country, for either government, should not be exempt from state taxation.

Thus, just as the legal incidence of the state tax became more determinative
than its economic burden in resolving federal-state taxation issues, so too
is the compelling tendency to utilize the "legal incidence" test in resolving
tribal-state taxation issues.
The Court has focused upon the "legal incidence" test as a basis for
many previous decisions.' Most noteworthy to this discussion is the
Chickasawopinion. 14 The court utilized the "legal incidence" test to find the
Oklahoma gasoline fuel tax unenforceable against a tribal enterprise. The
Court explained that the "initial and frequently dispositive question in
Indian tax cases...is who bears the legal incidence of a tax." 4s
' The answer
to this question may indicate a categorical bar to state taxation of activities
within Indian Country. If the legal incidence of state taxation falls upon the
activities of an Indian tribe or tribal member in Indian Country, then the tax
is categorically barred "absent dear congressional authorization."' In
contrast, a state tax whose legal incidence rests upon non-Indian activities
within Indian Country may implicate no categorical bar to enforcement. If
balancing federal, state, and tribal interests favors the state, and no federal
law preempts the tax, then the state may impose its tax.ss Chickasaw
instructed that any balancing of federal, state, and tribal interests is

146. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 US. 298 (1994) (holding that the
legal incidence of state franchise tax on calculating worldwide corporate reporting
requirements did not violate due process or commerce clauses); Intel Containers Int'l Corp.
v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) (holding that the legal incidence of state sales tax on lease
of cargo containers did not violate foreign commerce clause); South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505 (1988) (holding that the legal incidence of federal tax on state bondholder interest
earnings was constitutional); California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe,
474 U.S. 9 (1985) (holding that the legal incidence of state cigarette tax on non-Indian
consumers of tribally-owned smoke shop was not precluded); Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 US. 159 (1983) (holding that the legal incidence of state franchise upon
domestic corporation was proper); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 US. 176 (1983) (holding that
the legal incidence severance tax on oil producers was constitutional); Washington v. United
States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983) (holding that the legal incidence of state tax on materials sold to
federal contractors permissible). But see Ramah Navajo, 458 U.S. 832 (finding legal incidence
of state tax on non-Indian contractor not determinative, and relying instead upon the
economic burden as the basis for the Court's holding).
147. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
148. Id. at 458.
149. Id. at 459. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 US. 373 (1976) (barring state tax on
Indian-owned personal property situated in Indian Country); Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 475-81 (1976) (holding Montana's
cigarette sales tax imposed on retail consumers not applicable to on-reservation smoke shop
sales to tribal members); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
(holding state tax unenforceable on income earned by tribal members working for tribe and
residing on reservation).
150. See Chickasaw Nation,515 US. at 459.
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subsequent to determining whether the legal incidence of the questionable
state tax implicates a well-settled categorical impediment.
Following these instructions, the Blaze Court should find that the
legal incidence of the Arizona transaction privilege tax does not fall upon
the tribe or any of its members. In addition, the Court stated that "Ujudicial
focus on legal incidence in lieu of a more venturesome approach accords
due deference to the lead role of Congress in evaluating state taxation as it
bears on Indian tribes and tribal members."" 1 The focus upon the legal
incidence of the state tax accommodates "the reality that tax administration
requires predictability."'
The rationale of the Oklahoma v. ChickasawNation decision echoes
that of United States v. New Mexico in its aversion to look beyond the legal
incidence of a state tax to the economic burden. Oklahoma asserted that the
"economic realities" of its fuel tax shifted the burden to the retail
consumer."5 Indeed, the state asserted the legislative intent of its tax
evinced an expectation that distributors would pass their tax obligations on
to the ultimate purchaser."' Ergo, this economic reality necessarily shifted
the economic burden of the Oklahoma fuel tax away from the triballyowned retailer and onto its customers, most of whom were non-Indians
utilizing state jurisdiction roads." ' However, the Court declined to
entertain any consideration of economic realities or economic burdens as
too complicated. Instead, it preferred to rely on the "legal incidence"
inquiry as "a reasonably bright-line standard" that responded to the
necessity of substantial certainty for permissible taxation authority by
states with Indian Country."5
Two additional factors from the Chickasaw case point to a decision
against Blaze. First, states with substantial Indian populations requested
the court rely upon the legal incidence of the tax as a bright line standard."s
The Court agreed that applying this standard was analogous to its cases

151. Id. at 459. See also Yakima County v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 267 (1992) (reasoning that practicality and deference to congressional
balancing of interests during the process of legislation forms the basis for a categorical "per
se" approach to deciding taxation issues); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202,215 n.17 (1987) (following categorical approach to determine state tax prohibition);
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,148 (1973) (applying a "per se" categorical
approach by finding no congressional preemption of state tax).
152. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 459-60. See also Yakima County, 502 U.S. at 266-67
(criticizing the Ninth Circuit for determining county tax levy authority by analyzing multiple
factors).
153. See Petitioner's Brief in Chief at 12.
154. See id. at 10-11.
155. See id.
156. ChickasawNation, 515 U.S at 460.
157. See id.
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implicating federal immunity from state taxation."r Second, the Court
observed that a state may "amend its law to shift the tax's legal incidence"
from the tribally-owned retailer to the consumer for collection by the
retailer, thereby ameliorating the offending parts of the taxing statute.' By
placing an obligation upon the legislature to dearly express its taxing
intent, the Court also indicated that its own precedent supported such an
amendment."W Ultimately, the possibility of achieving more taxing
predictability by utilizing a bright-line standard should be attractive to the
Court in the B1aze decision.
FUTURE HARVESTS
"He is no wise man who will quit a certainty for an uncertainty."1 61
So it holds that, in taxation, wise men choose to move from uncertainty to
certainty. Both parties in Blaze, as well as amic, sought certainty of taxation
in Indian Country as the overriding goal of their litigation. The Court must
bear in mind whether its decision will continue to confuse the issue or
ultimately clarify it. Decisions that continue confusion generate additional
litigation. Conversely, decisions that create certainty in similar situations
suppress future litigation. The Court has compelling reasons to clarify
issues and suppress future litigation.
Precluding taxation of a federal contractor on the basis of a
"balancing of interest" test promotes more uncertainty of state taxation in
Indian Country. State actions would continue to be the result of the
"balancing of interest" inquiry formulated as a part of the Indian
law-federal preemption doctrine. For each bid, contractors would need to
perform a balancing inquiry to inform their bidding process. Contractors
and states, as in this case, would continue to argue and litigate over the
outcome of each other's respective balancing tests. This subjects the
taxation process, in need of substantial certainty, to continuing unnecessary
confusion.

158. See id. at 460 n.9 (citing United States v. Fresno County, 429 U.S. 452, 459 (1977))
("States may not...impose taxes the legal incidence of which falls on the Federal
Government.").
159. Id.at 460.
160. See id. at 459. See also Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512
U.%61 (1994) (holding that a state may place minimal burdens upon a tribe to collect its tax);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134,160 (1980) (holding that a state
may impose cigarette tax if legal incidence rests on non-Indian purchasers at tribal smoke
shop).
161. Samuel Johnson, The Idler, No. 57 (1758-80), reprinted in Oxford Dictionary of
Quotations 281 (3rd ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
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Establishing a bright-line standard to allow states to tax all federal
contractors, no matter where their activities take place, results in more
certainty in the administration of taxes. It stabilizes one more substantial
category of taxation in Indian Country. In fact, it establishes a categorical
application of state taxation to federal contractors in Indian Country,
perhaps settling future disputes before they arise. Consequently, states
having Indian Country within their borders would have firm footing to
levy taxes upon all federal contractors, no matter where the activity takes
place in their state, until Congress or their own legislature expresses
otherwise.
A decision against Blaze sends a strong message to all potential
federal contractors in Indian Country, insuring fairer competition in the
bidding process. Federal contractors will have no doubt that any applicable
state taxes should be included with their bids for Indian Country work.
Contractors calculating bids will not be required to exercise a balancing test
to determine their tax liability. The federal contractor may conclude that
state taxes would apply to the same extent as elsewhere in the state's
jurisdiction.
Contractors are typically required to calculate any and all taxes
(including employment) as a part of their ultimate bid.' 2 Federal agencies
expect applicable taxes to be passed through as a cost of construction or
providing services. Taxes not provided for in the bid are not recoverable
from the government later." In addition to complicating the bidding
process in Indian Country, anomalies or uncertainties in local taxation can
generate illusory bidding advantages. For example, a contractor could risk
obtaining relief from the payment of state taxes by excluding the taxes from
its bid in order to reap a potential three to five percent bidding hedge
against its competitors. Failure to assess state taxes for the federal project
lowers the total cost of the project by three to five percent, thereby making
it more likely for the offending contractor to receive the bid. The contractor
would then have to win the "balancing of interests" argument with the
state to maintain its profit margin. Certainty of taxation removes the
temptation of a contractor to take a risk in the bidding process in the hope

162. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.229-3(a) (1998) ("All applicable Federal, State, and local taxes and
duties, as used in this clause, means all taxes and duties, in effect on the contract date, that the
taxing authority is imposing and collecting on the transactions or property covered by this
contract....(b) The contract price includes all applicable Federal, State, and local taxes and
duties."). See also 48 C.F.IL P.H.S. § 352.280 (1998) (Clause No. 34-Except as may be
otherwise provided in this contract, the contract price includes all applicable Federal, State,
and local taxes and duties.").
163. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.229-3(b)-(d) (1998) (Taxes will only be reimbursed if the taxing
authority changes its law causing an increase of more than $250 during the life of the contract.
Likewise, the government expects to be reimbursed if taxation decreases.).
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of winning the argument against state taxation later. In the wake of this
Supreme Court decision, predictability will level the playing field for nonIndian contractors when bidding on federal contracts in Indian Country.
A natural resource developer may continue to conclude from the
future Blaze decision that its activities in Indian Country are subject to state
taxation unless Congress or the state legislature provides an express
exemption. Even though any tax represents a potential impediment to
profit maximization, the Court considers small percentage taxes
insubstantial. State taxes in the range of three to eight percent have been
upheld as nominal. Cotton Petroleum supports this assumption; however,
it precludes large taxes to promote the marketability of tribal resources.'"
Natural resource development in Indian Country does not get an
exemption from state taxation under normal circumstances. Hence, it is
against this background of general permissibility of state taxation in Indian
Country that business enterprises or resource developers should determine
the viability of projects.
Both contractors and natural resource developers should be
mindful that concurrent taxation by both Indian tribes and the state is
allowed in Indian Country. The. state of the law, unless Congress acts to
immunize parties from either jurisdiction, recognizes that "neither State
nor the Tribe enjoys authority to tax to the total exclusion of the other.""
The tribes may tax an activity as a sovereign and also receive royalties as
a property owner.16 Likewise, a state may tax the identical activity at its
normal nondiscriminatory rate.167 Accordingly, the only relief from taxation
for an enterprise by either a tribe or a state now rests on the legislative
processes of the Congress, the state lawmakers, or the Indian tribal
councils. Therefore, the contractor and natural resource developer in Indian
Country should operate under the general assumption that its activities are
taxable by federal, Indian, and state sovereigns unless specifically
exempted by either sovereign or by Congress.
Non-Indian businesses argue that allowing states to tax the same
activities within Indian Country impedes the Indian tribe's ability to levy
taxes to support their governmental operations.1 Indian tribes assert that
they have the dominant right to levy taxes to the exclusion of the states

164. See Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163, 186 n.17 (1989) (quoting
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 US. 997 (1988)) (noting that Montana's severance tax
was an exorbitant rate of 30%).
165. Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 699,716 (1998) (relying upon Cotton Petroleum,490
U.S. at 186-87).
166. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). See also discussion supra
note 11.
167. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189.
168. See Respondents' Brief. at 28-31, Arizona v. Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999).
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because of their inherent sovereignty. 169 However, in its present
evolutionary stage, the Indian law-federal preemption doctrine diminishes
the effectiveness of "inherent Indian sovereignty acting as a bar to state
jurisdiction and taxation. " " This is especially true where no tribal party is
directly impacted. The development and utilization of Indian law-federal
preemption doctrine as protection from state taxation relegated tribal
sovereignty to background information in deciding cases." In fact, it now
rarely impacts tax cases.
The Milhem Attea state-tribal taxation opinion in 1994 underscores
this point. It declared that "[r]esolution of conflicts of this kind does not
depend on rigid rules or on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or
tribal sovereignty, but instead on a particularized inquiry into the nature
of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority
would violate federal law."" As the Court increasingly relied on federal
preemption to protect Indian tribes from intrusive state authority, it
became, for all practical purposes, the only method for determining cases.
This development diminishes the influence of inherent tribal sovereignty
so much that it rarely influences the court's decisions in taxation cases.
Therefore, non-Indian businesses find little support for arguments that
press tax exemption for themselves by utilizing the jurisprudential shelter
of inherent tribal sovereignty and immunity.
The alternative argument declares that in balancing the tribal, state,
and federal interests as required by the Indian law-federal preemption
doctrine, the scales should tip in favor of protecting Indian interests and

169. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 US. 544 (1981). The Court found support that
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements.

Id. at 565.
170. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 US. 164,172 (1973) (citing Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US. 145 (1973)).
171. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (utilizing
tribal sovereignty as a backdrop to federal preemption of state taxation). Cf. Rice v. Rehner,
463 US. 713,719 (1983) (employing the "tradition of Indian sovereignty as a backdrop against
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read" in preemption analysis to find
state liquor permit required for Indian trader).
172. Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 US. 61, 73 (1994),
(emphasis added) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 US. 136,142,145
(1980)). See also Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163,176 (1989) (reiterating that
the court does not use mechanical conceptions of sovereignty in its analysis of federal
legislative preemptive effects).
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promoting the federal policy of Indian self-governance to block state
taxation. Indeed, there is an attractive economic policy rationale for
protecting tribal resources and reservation activities from state taxation.ln
However, this argument falls on deaf ears when presented by non-Indian
parties to a Supreme Court preferring to leave those policy decisions to
Congress.1 ' It appears to be well settled in the high court that future
balancing of interests will favor the state's authority to tax non-Indian
activities in Indian Country. Consequently, for non-Indian businesses and
resource developers in Indian Country, the Court sealed all the tax
loopholes, leaving just the classical immunities from state taxation for
Indian tribes and members."
HARVESTING TAX ABATEMENTS-LEGALLY
There are only two entities that can avoid federal and state taxation
in Indian Country. These are Indian tribes and tribal members. The
business or resource developer cannot remain autonomous from the tribe
and claim the tribe's immunity to avoid state taxation. This argument met
the same demise as that of federal contractors finding shelter under the
immunity of the federal government.17 Hence, the Indian Country
enterprise must appear to the state tax collector as belonging to the tribe or
a tribal member. Under current doctrine, if the legal incidence of the state
tax falls directly upon the Indian tribal enterprise or member, then the state
is categorically barred from taxation."n Consequently, non-Indian
enterprises desiring escape from state taxes should look for refuge by
establishing joint ventures or minority ownership arrangements with the
tribes or tribal members.1 ' Indeed, these arrangements and negotiations
may also lead to exemption from Indian tribal taxation. Another way to
avoid taxation requires the business enterprise to avail itself of specific tax
incentives offered by Congress to promote Indian Country development.
Both avenues will be explored briefly.
173. See generally Robert William Alexander, The Collision of Tribal Natural Resource
Development and State Taxation: An Economic Analysis, 27 N.M. L REV. 387 (1997) (employing
economic analysis to argue for policy changes in the way Indian natural resources are taxed).
174. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); Department
of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 US. 61 (1994); Cotton Petroleum,490 U.S.
at 165.

175. See ChickasawNation, 515 U.S. at 458.
176. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982).

177. See ChickasawNation,515 U.S. at 458.
178. See generally Lynn H. Slade, Structuring and FinancingNaturalResource and Energy
Development of Indian Lands, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1993, at 7 (offering a practical
explanation of factors and legal options to consider when developing natural resources in
Indian Country).
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The nature of the business organization determines much of the tax
liability. One way to avoid state taxation requires an organization known
as a tribal enterprise. Tribal enterprises describes a broad class of entities
owned and operated by tribal governments conducting the business
activities of the tribe, but having no distinct private legal identity.'" Tribal
enterprises are arms of the tribal government and controlled by the tribal
government."8 As with other tribal governmental functions, these tribal
enterprises maintain intergovernmental immunity from taxation."8
A tribal government may create a government corporation to
develop a resource and operate a business in order to separate the political
affairs of the tribe from the day-to-day affairs of the enterprise. Tribal
corporations are treated as persons and are citizens of the state where the
principal place of business is located." This attribute allows federal
jurisdiction for diversity purposes in suits involving a tribal corporation
under certain circumstances." However, the tribal law that creates these
entities determines the legal characteristics, capacities, missions, and
limitations of these corporations. 8 These corporations are still defined as

179. See Local IV-302 Int'l Woodworkers Union v. Menominee Tribal Enterprise, 595 F.
Supp. 859,862 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (finding district court without personal jurisdiction over tribal
enterprise which, having been specifically created by tribal constitution to act as principal
business arm of the tribe, shared in tribe's sovereign immunity from suit in state and federal
courts).
180. See, e.g., Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174,179-81 (2nd Cir. 1996).
181. See ChickasawNation, 515 US. at 454,461. Tribal enterprises also maintain sovereign
immunity from many other actions unless the tribes specifically and unequivocally waive it.
Cf. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 US. 751 (1998)
(holding a tribe entitled to sovereign immunity from suit on promissory note which it had
signed, regardless of whether note was signed on or off the reservation, and notwithstanding
that note allegedly related to its commercial activities); In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that tribe was immune to suit by Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee when trustee
was not an officer, agent or instrumentality of the United States); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding Indian tribes immune from suit by tribal members in
either state or federal courts, without congressional authorization or tribal consent). However,
because there may be compelling economic reasons for tribes to waive sovereign immunity
under certain conditions this governmental attribute should not deter mutually beneficial
negotiations between the developer and the tribe.
182. See Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that Indian tribe may
become a corporation by being chartered under Indian Reorganization Act and such a
corporate entity may be considered a citizen of the state of its principal place of business for
diversity jurisdiction purposes). See also Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1994).
183. See 28 US.C. § 1332 (1994) See, e.g., Stock West, Inc. v Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d
1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding "for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an Indian
corporation is a citizen of the state in whose borders the reservation is located").
184. See Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 700 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding legal
position of tribal housing and development enterprise separable from position of tribe, and
characteristics of enterprise were to be determined by tribal law).
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agencies of the tribal government and still subject to BIA supervision
requiring approval of contracts.' In addition to tax immunity, this
organizational'strategy offers a great deal of federal supervisory safeguards
that a tribal government, lacking resources in enterprise management,
might find attractive.
A tribe may consider organizing its resource development or
business enterprise as a Section 17, federally-chartered corporation
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)." The IRA
empowers these tribal corporations to lease tribal trust lands for a period
of up to 25 years." Corporations organized under this statute require no
prior approval by the Secretary of the Interior before entering into contracts
or conducting other business. Congress expressly granted such entities the
power to manage, operate, and dispose of real and personal property and
otherwise conduct corporate business."8 Thus, a federaUy-chartered
corporation may be an attractive organizational option for operating a
resource development or business enterprise in Indian Country. This
business structure offers a mix of federal supervision and backing, yet
freedom from day-to-day oversight by the BIA, plus general immunity
from state or federal taxation.
Federal Corporate Income Tax is not applicable to the profits of a
resource development or business enterprise operated by an Indian tribe
or instrumentality, either within or without Indian Country. The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has long held that income tax statutes do not apply
to the income of tribal organizations because they are political entities."
The IRS relies upon dicta in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones for support of
this policy.'" The reasoning of the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine found in McCulloch v. Maryland and its application to sovereign
instrumentalities offer additional support for this policy.' Based upon the
language and intent of the IRA, Section 17 corporations likewise are
immune from federal income taxation because they are federal
corporations. The IRS reasons that Congress has not intended to tax the

185. See Confederated Colville Tribes v. Stock West, Inc., 15 Ind. L. Rep. 6019 (Colville
Tribal Ct. 1988).
186. See 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1994).
187. See id.

188. See id.
189. See Rev. Rul. 94-16,1994-1 C.B. 19; Rev. Rul. 81-295,1981-2 C.B. 15; Rev. Rul. 67-284,
1967-2 C.B. 55. See also Scott A. Taylor, An Introductionand Ouerview of Taxation and Indian
Gaming 29 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 252, 252 (1997) (declaring a general lack of dear authority for
historical support of tribal tax immunity).
190. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US. 145 (1973) (observing the doctrine that
sovereign entities may not tax each other).
191. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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income of tribes; however, this immunity does not apply to state-chartered
tribal corporations.1" Accordingly, a resource development or business
enterprise owned and operated by the tribe as a governmental
instrumentality or Section 17 corporation would enjoy federal and state
income tax immunity, thereby increasing the net revenues generated by the
operation.
All tribal business entities are required to pay federal employeerelated taxes. Taxes requiring an employer to contribute to the general
welfare of the employees are the Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA)'" and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).194 The IRS
applies these taxes to all employee wage categories in Indian Country.
Even though these statutes do not specifically mention Indian tribes, the
IRS argues that these employment taxes apply to Indian Country
operations and have been upheld in at least two cases.' Congress gave the
IRS administrative power to seize tribal assets, such as bank accounts and
investments, in order to satisfy federal employment tax liabilities.1' Tribal
officials or corporate officers may be held personally responsible for tax
liabilities if tribal or corporate assets are insufficient to cover the tax liability
to the IRS." Therefore, any tribal enterprise operating within Indian
Country, no matter how organized, finds no advantage in operational
efficiency when considering these employment-related taxes.
Congress provides another way for private business enterprises to
avoid taxation in Indian Country. Certain employment-related and capital
investment income tax incentives are available in order to encourage job
development in Indian Country by privateoor state-chartered corporations.
These two tax incentives were incorporated into the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA) and expire at the end of the year 2003.'"
The policy envisions that economic development and job development
within Indian Country will have a greater positive impact than similar
development in nearby non-Indian communities. This policy concludes
that the wealth and income created in Indian Country is more likely to be

192. See Rev. Rul. 94-16,1994-1 C.B. 19.
193. See Federal Insurance Contribution Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33,1381-83(d) (1994).
194. See I.ILC. § 3301 (1994).
195. See In re Cabazon Indian Casino, 57 B.L 398 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); Washoe Tribes v.
United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19718 (D. Nev. 1979).
196. See I.R.C. §§ 6331-43 (1994).
197. See I.R.C. § 6672 (1994).
198. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66,107 Stat. 558-63 (codified
as I.R.C. §§ 38(b), 45A, and 168Q) (1994). However, neither incentive is applicable to gaming
activities. See I.R.C. § 168Q)(4)(A)(iv) (1994)).
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spent there in support of retail products and services, thereby reducing
economic leakage from the Indian community.1'
Congress established an Indian employment income tax credit in
Section 13321 of OBRA.m This credit lowers federal income tax liability by
20 percent on a private business that employs tribal members or their
spouses who live on or near the reservation and work primarily on the
reservation.?l This means that the federal government effectively pays the
wages of every fifth Indian-related employee through this tax incentive.
Accordingly, a private corporation considering resource development or
other business enterprise in Indian Country, working in concert with a
tribe, realizes a substantial benefit from the application of this tax credit to
its net profit when compared to operating a similar concern outside Indian
Country.
Additional incentives for private business job development
through accelerated depredation of capital investments appear in Section
13322 of the OBRA of 1993. Certain private business property utilized in
Indian Country qualifies for depreciation schedules from two years to 22
years.' For instance, machinery normally depreciable in seven years under
this law is fully depreciable in four years. Real property that is normally
depreciable in 39 years is fully depreciable in 22 years.2' Generally,
depredation is accelerated from 33 percent to 43 percent. The accelerated
depredation also applies to infrastructure improvements in Indian
Country, such as roads, power lines, and water systems that may have to
be connected to existing infrastructure outside of Indian Country.' Thus,
an investor in an Indian Country development or business enterprise
recaptures the use of their money substantially quicker. Therefore, the tax
savings from taking higher depreciation deductions much earlier than an
identical private investment outside of Indian Country represent an
enormous incentive and tax abatement strategy.
States are also barred from taxing real property of Indians in Indian
Country. Many states disclaim title in and proprietary interest over Indian
lands and recognize that Indian lands remain under absolute authority and
jurisdiction of the Congress.' For example, enabling act provisions in the
state constitution authorizing New Mexico to join the union clearly

199. See Michael J.Kurman, Indian Investment and Employment Tax Incentives: Building a
New Highway to IndianCountryfor PrivateSector Businesses and Jobs, 41 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 578
(1994).
200. See I.R.C. § 45A (1994).
201. See id.
202. See I.R.C. § 168(j)(4)(C) (1994).
203. See id.
204. See I.R.C. § 168(j)(4)(C) (1994).
205. See, e.g., N.M. CoNST. art. XXI, § 2.
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preclude state real property taxes on trust lands within Indian Country.'
The Supreme Court also recognizes that permanent improvements to
Indian-owned property in Indian Country are immune to state taxation.2
However, personal property or improvements by non-Indians on land
within Indian Country are not immune from state ad valorem taxation.'
Accordingly, any development of Indian-owned enterprises within Indian
Country on tribal land, or land held in federal trust, will not be subject to
any state property taxes. Preclusion of property taxes, like exemption from
any other taxation, positively influences the net operating profits realized
by enterprises operating in Indian Country.
Finally, state corporate income taxes do not apply to earnings of
a tribal operation or a Section 17 corporation. Here again, if the legal
incidence of the state tax falls upon the tribe or its instrumentality within
Indian Country, then the state is barred from imposition of the tax absent
clear congressional authorization.' However, the Supreme Court
acknowledges that New Mexico retains the right to tax all Indian land and
operations located or occurring outside of Indian Country.2 1 Therefore,
tribally owned and operated enterprises within Indian Country enjoy both
federal and state income tax immunity, resulting in a substantial
improvement in net profit for the operation. All things considered, many
options exist to legally avoid taxation in Indian Country. Indeed, many
good reasons also exist for avoiding taxation through the aforementioned
methods rather than risking litigation arguing for an expansive
interpretation of the Indian law-federal preemption doctrine.

206.

See, e.g., Prince v. Board of Educ., 543 P2d 1176,1180-1 (N.M. 1975) (explaining the

non-taxable status of trust lands within Indian Country by application of state enabling act).
207.

See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding mobile home of tribal

member located within Indian Coutry not subject to personal property taxation); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US. 145,158 (1973) (holding personal property of tribal enterprise
located on federal trust lands not subject to personal property taxation).
208. See Prince, 543 P.2d at 1181. "Private non-Indian corporations cannot escape their

obligation"to pay state taxes by locating their property on Indian reservations." Id. See also
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949) (holding state may tax personal
property and production of non-Indian oil lessees in Indian Country); Thomas v. Gay, 169

U.S.264 (1898) (upholding county ad valorem taxation on cattle owned by non-Indian lessees
of reservation grazing land). Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding
tribal ski resort activities outside of reservation were taxable by state, however personal and

real property of tribe within reservation not taxable).
209. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,459 (1995); Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,764 (1985).
210. See Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 149-50 (holding that Indian-owned lands outside of
reservations and not in U.S. trust status are taxable by state); County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (holding that fee lands of tribe or tribal members within

reservation subject to state property tax).
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AT THE END OF THE DAY
In one light, allowing states to tax non-Indian activities within
Indian Country has been argued to impede reservation economic activity,
reduce real dollar benefits of critical funding, and hamper a tribe's ability
to govern itself." From another view, such a decision may actually
promote economic self-determination for the tribes and their members in
Indian Country. An inherently natural impetus to avoid state taxation may
encourage development of enterprises by tribal entities and members in
Indian Country, either alone or in conjunction with non-Indian developers.
However, the amount and nature of taxation exacted by the tribe in its selfgovernance will also determine the speed at which this kind of
development proceeds. Indeed, tribal self-determination in either restrictive
regulation or entrepreneurial promotion could influence resource
enterprises more dramatically than the
development and business
212
taxation.
state
of
influence
Nevertheless, with all other factors being equal, current taxation
laws and doctrine bestow an advantage on tribal or member-owned
construction, resource development, and business enterprises when
bidding on federal contracts or initiating commercial activities. Thus, this
slight tilt in the playing field coupled with the desire to avoid taxation
actually act in concert with each other to stimulate tribal or member
business and resource development for Indian Country. Whether by design
or accident, this appears to be the federal policy at the moment. Therefore,
as a practical matter, employing the aforementioned methods represents
the surest way to harvest tax abatements for business enterprises in Indian
Country.

211. See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., ProtectingTribal Sovereignty: Why States Should Not Be Able
to Tax ContractorsHired by the BIA To Construct Reservation Projectsfor Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 459 (1996) (criticizing the New Mexico, Blaze Constructionv. Taxation and Revenue
decision as an obstruction of Indian sovereignty and frustration of tribal economic
development).

212. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the difficulties of economic
development in Indian Country. The author recognizes that many factors other than taxation
often impede economic self-determination for tribal communities. For an overview of the
many impediments to economic self-determination, see Frank Pommershiem, Economic
Development in Indian Country: What Are the Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 195 (1987). For
a comprehensive review of this subject, see Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the

Dice: Improving the Chancesfor Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT
CAN TRIBEs Do? 2 (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1995).
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ADDENDUM
On March 2, 1999, Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for the
unanimous court in Arizona Departmentof Revenue v. Blaze Construction.2
The Court held that a state may impose non-discriminatory taxes on
private company proceeds from federal contracts when the contractor
performs services within Indian Country.' The decision rested on the clear
rule announced in United States v. New Mexico that "tax immunity is
appropriate in only one circumstance: when the levy falls on the United
States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the
government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate
entities... " 21 The Court found that the legal incidence of Arizona's
transaction privilege tax fell on Blaze, not the federal government, and that
Congress had not exempted Blaze's federal contracts from state taxation.
Thus, the principles of United States v. New Mexico controlled the resolution
of the case.
The Court spoke to the application of the Indian law-federal
preemption doctrine by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Justice Thomas
observed that the Court employed the "particularized examination"
enunciated in Ramah Navajo216 only "where the legal incidence of the [state]
tax fell on a nontribal entity engaged in a transaction with tribes or tribal
members."21 The Court distinguished the instant case from the long line
of taxation cases utilizing the balancing test of the Indian law-federal
preemption doctrine.' The Court also reinforced the policy objective,
announced in Chickasaw, to avoid interest balancing when a clear rule is
available.219 Thus, "[t]he need to avoid litigation and to ensure efficient tax
administration counselled] in favor of a bright-line standard for
taxation...."i2Thecourt reminded the disputants that the power to exempt
Blaze from Arizona's taxes rested with the state legislature or Congress, not
the court.n' Thus, in a straightforward manner, the Court easily resolved
the state-tribal taxation conflict. However, the simplicity of the decision
213. See Arizona v. Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999).
214. See id. at 960.
215. Id.at 959 (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720,735 (1982)).
216. See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 US. 832,838 (1982).
217. Arizona v. Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957,960 (1999).
218. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Co., Inc. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163, 176-87 (1989);
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 US. 832,836-46 (1982); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,144-53 (1980); Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 448 US. 160,165-66 (1980).
219. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 US. 450, 458-59 (1995)
(declaring "legal incidence" the dearer rule).
220. Arizona v. Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957,960 (1999).
221. See id. at 961.
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bears within it the seeds of future Supreme Court policy on the issue of
state taxation in Indian Country.
Blaze sets the stage for the exclusive utilization of the "legal
incidence" test to determine tax immunity in Indian Country. The "legal
incidence" test has been the preferred initial and controlling inquiry in the
last two state-tribal taxation cases that the Court considered.' In
Chickasaw, the Court determined that the legal incidence of the state tax fell
on the tribal retailer, therefore the tax was categorically barred.' Here, the
Court determined the legal incidence of the state tax fell upon the private
contractor, therefore the tax was allowable.' Both decisions garnered
unanimous consent for an inquiry to determine the legal incidence of the
tax, not the economic burden or economic realities of the tax. In fact, the
Court unequivocally rejected the application of the fact-intensive inquiry
required by an "economic burden" or "economic reality" analysis as too
venturesome and perilous.', In both cases, the legal incidence inquiry
controlled the resolution of the contested taxation authority. Moreover, the
strong policy rationale of establishing a bright-line standard enhancing the
predictability of tax administration compelled the Court to settle on this
simple test. Indeed, the Court utilized the "legal incidence" test in both
cases despite the fervent urgings of the losing parties to engage in the
"balancing of interest" test required under the Indian law-federal
preemption doctrine.' Therefore, a well-established tax immunity
doctrine, deference to the legislature, and avoidance of a fact-intensive
inquiry bolsters the Court's preference for using the "legal incidence" test
in determining state tax questions in Indian Country.'
The Court appears comfortable with employing the "legal
incidence" test as a dispositive tool to decide taxation questions. Having
successfully proven the "legal incidence" test valuable for deciding knotty
Indian-state taxation issues, the Court has established a precedent to apply
the "legal incidence" test to tougher issues. Consequently, the Court
signaled that an issue for future consideration is "whether the [Indian
222. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); Arizona v.
Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957 (1999).
223. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458-59; Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 US. 463,483 (1976); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992).
224. See Arizona v. Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957,960 (1999) (citing United States v.
New Mexico, 455 US. 720,743-44 (1982)).
225. See Blaze Constr., 119 S. Ct. at 961 n.3 (criticizing this approach as too perilous by
pointing to the opposite conclusions reached by New Mexico and Arizona on the very issue
before it); Chikasaw Nation,515 U..q at 45960 (adhering to a "legal incidence" analysis while
clearly rejecting the "economic reality" or "economic burden" approach as too venturesome).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 49-70,147-61.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 131-61.
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law-federal preemption] doctrine would apply when Tribes choose to take
a more direct and active role in administering [their] federal funds."' In
other words, if the tribe is granted federal funds and executes its own
projects by hiring non-Indian private contractors, may states then impose
state gross receipt or transaction privilege taxes on those contractors for
work performed in Indian Country?
This question strikes at the heart of the Ramah Navajo holding. That
case based its holding on determining where the economic burdens of the
state tax lay, rather than the legal incidence. Ramah Navajo found that the
economic burden of the state tax fell on the tribal organization and barred
collection from the non-Indian building contractor.2" Now, the Court
refuses to recognize economic burdens as a factor in its state tax
considerations. Ramah Navajo found that a detrimental influence on the
tribe and the incidental restriction on promoting federal-Indian programs
barred the state's taxation.' However, according to Cotton Petroleum,
insignificant state taxes do not thwart federal Indian programs. 1 Through
the Blaze decision, the Court took one further step to equate the tax
immunity of Indian tribes with the tax immunity of the federal
government0' Thus, if a case like Ramah Navajo were to be decided today
employing the "legal incidence" test, the state would be allowed to collect
taxes on the non-Indian contractor's proceeds.
Hereafter, the non-Indian contractor building roads, constructing
schools, or performing any service for an Indian tribe cannot cloak itself in
the immunity of the tribe anymore than it can with the federal government.
By relying on the "legal incidence" test as a basis for its decision, the Court
is poised to find that taxes imposed on non-Indian contractors working for
tribes in Indian Country are no different than the taxes imposed on nonIndian contractors anywhere else in a state. Accordingly, in the shadow of
Blaze, it would appear that a state may impose a tax on the receipts of a
non-Indian contractor working in Indian Country, even though paid with
funds from the tribe, because the legal incidence of the tax falls on the
contractor, not on the tribe. Thus, unless Congress acts expressly to exempt
its funding for Indian Country projects and services from state taxation,
proceeds earned by non-Indian contractors performing work in Indian
Country for the tribes will be taxable when either the state or the tribe
exercise taxing sovereignty. Therefore, non-Indian business enterprises,
contractors, and natural resource developers should prepare to pay all

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Arizona v. Blaze Constr. Co., 119 S. Ct. 957,961 (1999).
See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832,842 (1982).
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-26.
See id.
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applicable state and tribal taxes for any work performed in Indian Country
unless otherwise exempted by the state, the tribe, or Congress.
JAMES M. BURSON

